Supply-Chain Gates

Supply-Chain Gates (Phase 8 · Block A)

OmniRoute publishes npm + Docker artifacts. These gates provide provenance, inventory (SBOM) and CVE scanning, all OSS, plugged into release workflows. Advisory-first posture — they report now, promote to blocking after the 1st green release.

Gate	Tool	Where	Blocks?	Output
SLSA provenance (npm)	npm --provenance (OIDC)	npm-publish.yml	only if publish fails	badge npmjs / npm audit signatures
SBOM npm	@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm	npm-publish.yml	only if generation fails	Release asset + artifact
SBOM image	anchore/sbom-action (syft)	docker-publish.yml (merge)	advisory	CycloneDX artifact
Trivy CVE (SARIF)	aquasecurity/trivy-action	docker-publish.yml (merge)	advisory	SARIF (HIGH+CRITICAL) → Security tab
Trivy CRITICAL gate	aquasecurity/trivy-action	docker-publish.yml (merge)	blocking	exit-code: '1' on fixable CRITICAL
osv vulnCount	osv-scanner (check:vuln-ratchet --ratchet)	ci.yml (quality-extended)	blocking	ratchets metrics.vulnCount (direction:down)
OpenSSF Scorecard	ossf/scorecard-action	scorecard.yml (cron)	advisory	SARIF → Security + badge

The image CVE ratchet uses two steps in docker-publish.yml: the SARIF step (HIGH,CRITICAL, exit-code: 0) keeps HIGH+CRITICAL visible in the Security tab without blocking; the CRITICAL gate step (severity: CRITICAL, ignore-unfixed: true, exit-code: 1) fails the release on a CRITICAL CVE with a fix available. ignore-unfixed prevents blocking the release for a base-image CVE without an upstream patch.

⚠️ CVE Variance (blocking osv/Trivy gates)

osv and Trivy compare deps against CVE databases that continuously grow. A PR that touches no dependencies can suddenly turn red because a new CVE was disclosed in an existing dep (osv: measured vulnCount > baseline; Trivy: a new fixable CRITICAL in the image). This is EXPECTED operational behavior of a blocking CVE gate, not a product regression.

When osv or Trivy go red due to a newly disclosed CVE, the remedy is:

1. Bump the affected dep (preferred) — upgrade to the patched version via package.json overrides (transitive deps) or rebuild the image on a patched base.
2. If there is no upstream fix:
   • osv: re-baseline metrics.vulnCount in config/quality/quality-baseline.json (npm run quality:ratchet -- --update does not cover dedicated gates — edit the value by hand, direction:down) with a justification note + tracking issue.
   • Trivy: add an entry in .trivyignore (CVE-ID per line) with a justification comment + tracking issue. ignore-unfixed: true already covers CVEs without patches automatically.

Both gates gracefully SKIP (exit 0) when the tool is absent or the measurement fails (osv-scanner not in PATH, osv.dev/network unreachable, invalid JSON) — a measurement failure never blocks, only a measured regression blocks.

Known Accepted Risks

extract-zip 2.0.1 — GHSA-7pqw-9j4j-h8q3 / GHSA-jmr9-qjv8-65gv (#14482)

extract-zip@2.0.1 carries two unpatched high-severity symlink-traversal advisories. Per the “no upstream fix” branch of the CVE Variance remedy above, this is an accepted risk, not a bump:

• Chain: promptfoo (devDependency) → @openai/codex-security → extract-zip@2.0.1. Confirmed via package-lock.json — exactly one package in the whole dependency tree (@openai/codex-security) declares extract-zip, and exactly one package (promptfoo) declares @openai/codex-security.
• No fixed release exists anywhere in the chain. extract-zip@2.0.1 (published 2020) is the package’s final release — it is unmaintained. @openai/codex-security’s current npm-latest (0.1.29) still pulls extract-zip@2.0.1.
• Unreachable from production. promptfoo is devDependency-only (never listed under dependencies), and no file under src/, open-sse/, or bin/ imports the extract-zip npm package — OmniRoute’s own extractZip() helper (src/lib/versionManager/binaryManager.ts:93) shells out to native unzip/tar and is unrelated. @openai/codex-security also ships its own symlink-traversal guard on top of extract-zip’s onEntry callback.
• Do not alias extract-zip via package.json overrides — the only viable drop-in replacement is Electron-org-internal and API-incompatible with @openai/codex-security’s own onEntry/defaultDirMode/defaultFileMode checks; overriding it would silently break that package’s security checks.
• Baseline: measured osv vulnCount (3) is already well under the frozen config/quality/quality-baseline.json baseline (27) — no ratchet change needed.
• Regression guard: tests/unit/extract-zip-14482-exposure.test.ts asserts the chain and the no-production-import invariant above; it fails CI if either ever breaks (e.g. a future PR makes extract-zip reachable from production).
• Tracking: issue #14482.

Backlog: Scorecard advisory → blocking

After the 1st green release with Scorecard reporting:

• Scorecard: score ratchet (freezes the measured score; cannot decrease).

Complements the Phase 7 gates (osv-scanner, gitleaks, actionlint+zizmor): zizmor audits the workflows themselves; Scorecard measures the repo posture in aggregate.

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